Bad Decisions...
...resulting from U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) premature, unsupported announcement,
shortly after 9/11/01, that "air is safe to breathe, water safe to
drink" in Lower Manhattan -- and reasons to reallocate some of those
billions committed by the federal government to remediate Lower Manhattan
Compiled By Members of 9/11 Environmental Action
1. Decision by
first responders -- who learned as early as the first or second day that EPA
thought there was no problem -- to be less concerned about getting/wearing
adequate protective gear.
2. Decision to
not evacuate all the people living in harm's way until it was certain
that they were not in danger.
3. Decision to
reopen the Stock Exchange before office buildings, retail stores, subways etc.
had been proven to be clear of contaminants, endangering the health of
thousands of workers.
4. Decision by EPA, and other agencies at all levels, not to do as much
testing of air and dust as they should have.
5. Decision by
EPA right after 9/11 to refuse offers of sampling equipment and personnel from
EPA Region 8 and Desert Research Institute (Reno).
6. Decision to
permit reoccupation of residences and businesses before there was evidence that
it was safe to do so.
7. Decision by
Gov. Pataki to not include, in his request for federal disaster funds, a
specific request for funds for a complete toxic cleanup
8. Decision by
NYC Board of Ed that it was safe for Stuyvesant students to go back to school
on Oct 9. It was later found that
asbestos and lead levels were high even after subsequent cleanings. Cases of nosebleeds, coughing and many more
symptoms were never collected in a scientific study, and there was insufficient
nursing staff to screen students complaining of illness.
9. Decision by
EPA not to immediately start cleaning up indoor spaces, delegating that
responsibility to the New York City Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP).
10
Decision by the City DEP
delegating indoor cleanup to landlords, with no oversight or follow-up to
ensure that landlords actually did the cleanup — because the dust was
supposedly not toxic.
11
Decision by the New York
City Department of Health (DOH) to urge homeowners and office workers to clean
up the dust themselves, without protection and using crude methods — because
the dust was supposedly not toxic.
12. Decision not to have any kind of "smog"
alert or noxious dust protocol in place in the City, even after the attack
spread toxic fumes and contaminants for miles, for several months.
13. Decisions by EPA to withhold data on air quality
from scientists, residents and even public officials; to delay putting
information on their web site about air quality tests; to post only a tiny
fraction of available information; to not aggregate information from all
relevant agencies in one place (instead, their site had links to other web
sites).
14. Decision by EPA not to ensure that the fires at
the disaster site — the source of
massive, continuing toxic emissions — were extinguished quickly; instead,
relegating it to the New York City Fire Department, whose depleted force was
consumed with rescue and recovery.
15. Decisions by residents and offices not to throw
out carpets, drapes and other soft furnishings, although the EPA knew that
those items cannot be completely cleaned of asbestos, even by the most
stringent methods.
16. Decision by EPA, when it finally did start a
remediation program a year later, to design it as a voluntary, arbitrarily
limited program which did not clean entire HVAC systems, offices or most
residences near Ground Zero, and none in Brooklyn or above Canal St. (they
couldn't contradict their own earlier reassuring statements). Among many seriously flawed program
protocols: clearance testing after
cleaning was only for asbestos and not for dioxins, metals and fiberglass; the
need to clean HVAC systems was determined by using visual inspection rather
than analytical sampling; residents could choose 'passive' air testing --
either by itself or after cleaning -- a method that does not provide assurances
that homes are free of asbestos or other contaminants; contracted cleaning
crews removing asbestos contaminated hallway carpeting were not given
respirators or other protective clothing, and were not even required to wear
dust masks.
17. Decision by EPA not to do much testing for PAHs (a fact that EPA’s peer review panel noted in their
July, 2003 sessions).
18. Decision by Gov. Pataki to suspend, for the World
Trade Center recovery and site cleanup, State environmental regulations
governing the transport and disposal of toxic waste. The governor signed this executive order on
October 9, 2001, the very day that Stuyvesant High students were made to return
to classes, next to Hudson River Pier 25.
The governor’s order led to the following:
19. Decision by the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC) to allow an uncovered barge-loading operation
for WTC toxic waste at Pier 25, adjacent to Stuyvesant High School and within a block of
residences and other schools; and to the decision to allow the transport of
toxic waste through city neighborhoods in leaky, tarp-covered trucks rather
than totally sealed vehicles. Yes, the
site cleanup was completed months ahead of schedule, but at the expense of
people’s health!
20. Decision by whatever government agency should have
been in charge that there was no urgent need to get protective respirators to
everyone working anywhere near the toxic waste and fires. It was publicized much later that the US Army
had plenty of respirators in storage that could have been deployed in NYC.
21. Decision by FEMA to not pay for businesses to
remediate their premises (because they said insurance companies would pay for
it).
22. Decision by insurance companies not to cover
claims to remediate dust contamination because “there was no problem.”
23. Decision by the insurance companies to
encourage people to move back in quickly so that their living-out expenses were
limited .
24. Decisions by non-residents to take government
bribes to move into Downtown (without full knowledge of the possible
contamination in the buildings into which they were moving).
25. Decisions by relatively few residents to sign up
for the voluntary clean-up, since they were initially, and continually,
reassured by EPA statements.
26. Decisions by volunteers from around the world
(e.g., Southern Baptist crews who cleaned apartments at Thanksgiving, 2001,
some of whom were teenagers), who unknowingly assumed risks that they might not
have elected to expose themselves to had they been honestly informed.
27. Decision by Red Cross to discourage
volunteers and participants at the October 11, 2001 memorial from wearing masks
although they were plentiful and available.
28. Decision by those exposed to WTC air and dust
not to consider their symptoms (shortness of breath, etc.) to be an illness
caused by exposure to toxics, and therefore not to seek treatment. Doctors have said the sooner patients receive
treatment, the better.
29. Decision not to begin a health registry of all
those exposed to contaminated air or dust until years after the exposure,
ensuring that the registry, when begun, would omit data about people who had
already died or suffered in the interim, and increasing the likelihood of faulty data collection
and inaccurate conclusions about the health impacts of the WTC collapses and
fires.
30. Decision by Red Cross to refuse to notify
volunteers that they had been exposed and that they are eligible for the
Registry and Health Care for injuries from the attack.
31. Decision by doctors not to pay special attention
to their patients who lived, worked or were otherwise exposed to WTC air and
dust, because they believed it to be safe (note how even Mt. Sinai admits they
fell for this).
32. Decision to allow ongoing digging and construction
at the WTC site, as well as at the site of #7 WTC, without testing the site or,
if any tests were done, without publicly releasing the results.